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THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP AND THE TAX BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Black/white racial wealth gap in the United States is huge.1 It is persistent.
And it has changed very little since the 1960s. In 2019, before the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic and some fifty-five years after landmark civil rights legislation
intended to equalize access to housing, education, and employment,2 the net assets of
the median Black family in America were less than 15 percent of the net assets of the
median white family. The typical white family had median net assets of $188,200; for
the typical Black family the median was $24,100.3 In other words, white families had
almost eight times more net assets than Black families.4 The numbers are shocking.
That an enormous racial wealth gap exists at this time in our history flies in the
face of the progress-toward-racial-equality narrative that holds our national psyche
so firmly in its grip.5 Although now more widely discussed in the popular press,
academic scholarship, and across the internet, misconceptions about the dimensions
and the causation of racial economic inequality abound.6 As an entry point for
discussion of this urgent problem, this article presents an explication of one of the
societal structures, colorblind on its face, that has contributed to America’s racial
wealth gap—the slate of income tax benefits conferred on homeownership.
Over the past 109 years of the modern federal income tax, wealth-building tax
benefits for homeowners, especially the exclusion of imputed rental income from
1.

A note on terminology and racial classifications. Racial identification in statistical sources has evolved over
time. In this article, the term “Black” refers to non-Hispanic Blacks and the term “white” refers to nonHispanic whites. “Hispanics” refers to Hispanics of all races. These are the broad racial classifications used
in the statistics compiled in federal government surveys such as the U.S. Census Current Population Survey,
the U.S. Census American Community Survey, and the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer
Finances. More recent sources sometimes provide statistics regarding persons of Asian, Native Alaskan,
Native American, and Pacific Islander descent as a group; older sources report “Other” as a classification.

2.

See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 and 52 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2342 and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

3.

Neil Bhutta et al., Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, Bd.
Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys. [hereinafter Disparities in 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances], https://www.
federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm (Sept. 28, 2020). “Medians” better represent the typical
family and are used in this article rather than “means” to avoid the distortions that result from averaging
in outliers such as billionaires and families with negative assets.

4.

The Hispanic/white wealth gap is of similar proportions, but at 78.3 percent in 2019, it is narrower than
the Black/white gap. See Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America,
Urb. Inst. [hereinafter Nine Charts], https://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/ (Oct.
24, 2017). Discussion of this vital problem and the growing body of research documenting and analyzing
it is beyond the scope of this article.

5.

See Jennifer A. Richeson, The Mythology of Racial Progress, Atlantic, Sept. 2020, at 9, 10–12; Michael W.
Kraus et al., The Misperception of Racial Economic Inequality, 14 Pers. on Psych. Sci. 899, 899–921 (2019)
(indicating that white Americans underestimate the racial wealth gap by 900 percent).

6.

Kraus et al., supra note 5, at 917; see also Dion Rabouin, 10 Myths About the Racial Wealth Gap, Axios (July 23,
2020), https://www.axios.com/racial-wealth-gap-ten-myths-d14fe524-fec6-41fc-9976-0be71bc23aec.html.
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owner-occupied housing, have been enormous. Since the 1970s, the homeownership
rate for white American families has been at about 72 percent.7 For Black American
families the homeownership rate has been barely above 40 percent.8 In other words,
more than 70 percent of white families can benefit from these wealth-building tax
breaks while almost 60 percent of Black families cannot.9 Faced with these facts, it is
difficult not to conclude that the tax benefits of homeownership have become racialized.
Part II of this article examines the racial wealth gap and the intertwined racial
homeownership gap. Part III provides an introduction to the long tradition of federal
income tax benefits relating to homeownership and the tax expenditure budget
quantification of this investment of national resources. It then examines eight tax
benefits of homeownership that collectively compound the racial wealth gap. Part IV
reviews the three prerequisites for purchasing a home and the structural inequities that
both historically and currently make them barriers to Black American homeownership
and, consequently, limit the opportunities for Black families to amass generational
wealth. Part V concludes this article with a proposed method for reducing the
inequalities fostered by the tax subsidies currently reserved for homeowners.
The racial wealth gap stands in the way of the racial equality and the multiracial
democracy to which we as a nation claim to aspire. It is also a drag on the national
economy.10 If we are to solve this problem, we need to name it and understand it.
II. THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP AND THE RACIAL HOMEOWNERSHIP GAP

A. The Racial Wealth Gap

In recent years, economists have focused on household wealth rather than
household income as the better measure of financial well-being. Although household
income is also a significant marker and indeed is the key driver of household wealth,
it does not take into account resources that wealth represents, such as savings, home
equity, or investments that a family can tap to cushion a job loss, pay for an emergency
repair, educate children, retire, or get through a pandemic. For this reason, household
or family wealth is now the typical focus in assessments of social inequality.11
Wealth in this context does not mean affluence or riches. It merely denotes the
existence of some amount of net worth, some amount by which a family’s assets
exceed its debt and other liabilities. Functionally, wealth is a measure of the resources
7.

See Disparities in 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3.

8.

See id.; Jung Hyun Choi, Racial Homeownership Rates Vary Across the Most Commonly Cited Datasets. When
and Why Should You Use Different Ones?, Urb. Inst. (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/
racial-homeownership-rates-vary-across-most-commonly-cited-datasets-when-and-why-should-you-usedifferent-ones.

9.

See infra Figure 4 (showing a stark disparity in white, Black, and Hispanic family homeownership).

10.

See Elana Duré, Here’s How the Racial Wealth Gap Affects the Entire Nation, J.P. Morgan Wealth
Mgmt. (July 15, 2021), https://www.chase.com/personal/investments/learning-and-insights/article/
heres-how-the-racial-wealth-gap-affects-the-entire-nation.

11.

Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth 2 (2d ed. 2006).
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available to improve a person’s quality of life and provide stability and access to
opportunities for well-being.12
Looking at family financial well-being over time, the dimensions of the racial
wealth gap—both its size and its persistence—become clear.13 The timeline starts with
1963, the year before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a law that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in
hiring, promotion, and firing; in public accommodations; and in federally funded
programs.14 It also banned segregation in public schools and discrimination in public
facilities and service, and it created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.15
In 1963, the median wealth of non-white families was $2,467, while that of a typical
white family was $47,655.16 Thus, the net worth of the typical non-white family
immediately before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 5 percent of the typical white
family’s net worth.17 The racial wealth gap was 95 percent.18
Figure 1 Median Family Wealth by Race and Ethnicity, 1963–201619

12.

Id. at 30.

13.

See infra Figure 1 (illustrating the history of the racial wealth gap based on household net worth and
income by race and ethnicity).

14.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 and 52 U.S.C.).

15.

Id. The mission of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is to remedy and ultimately end
unlawful employment discrimination in the workplace. Id.

16.

See Nine Charts, supra note 4 (tracking median family wealth on the basis of race and ethnicity between
1963 and 2016).

17.

Id.

18.

Id. Until 1983, the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances, on which the chart reproduced
in Figure 1 is based, reported only two racial classifications: white and non-white. Id. This is why the
measures of Black and Hispanic family wealth appear identical through 1983.

19.

Id. (click “SAVE CHART” then click “JPG” under “Median”) (depicting Chart 3 created by the Urban
Institute). To view the data on which this chart is based in a user-friendly format, see Dorothy S.
Projector, Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, Fed. Rsrv. Bull., Mar. 1964, at 285, 285–93;
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Nearly fifty years later, the median Black/white racial wealth gap in 2016 was
roughly 90 percent.20 Indeed, between 1983 and 2016, the gap grew: In 1983, the
typical white family had eight times the wealth of the typical Black family; in 2016,
white families had almost ten times the wealth.21 The gap narrowed slightly in 2019 to
87.2 percent.22 And preliminary analyses suggest that the Black/white wealth gap grew
in the pandemic years from 2020 through the present, as Black workers and Black
communities have been more heavily impacted.23 Overall, the Federal Reserve Board’s
research shows that in more than half a century, the racial wealth gap has only
narrowed from 95 percent to 87.6 percent, an improvement of less than 8 percent.24
Figure 2 White and Black Median Family Wealth, 1989–201925

Dorothy S. Projector, Survey of Changes in Family Finances (1968); and Disparities in 2019
Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3, fig.1.
20. Nine Charts, supra note 4.
21.

Id.

22.

Disparities in 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3, fig.1.

23.

Id. This increase seems to be attributable to the delayed recovery of Black families from the Great
Recession. Id.; see also Christian E. Weller & Lily Roberts, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Eliminating
the Black-White Wealth Gap Is a Generational Challenge (2021).

24.

See Disparities in 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3; see also, e.g., Jeffrey P. Thompson &
Alice Henriques Volz, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., A New Look at Racial Disparities Using a
More Comprehensive Wealth Measure (2021).

25.

Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989–2019, Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.
federalreserve.gov/econres/scf/dataviz/scf/chart/index.html (choose “Net worth” from “Select household
financial component” dropdown; then choose “Race or ethnicity” from “Distribute by” dropdown; then
click “White, non-Hispanic” and “Black, non-Hispanic” under “Display”). This chart shows white and
Black median family wealth and the share of Black families below the white family median. Id. (showing
roughly $181,000 as median net worth for White families and roughly $24,000 as median net worth for
Black families). Dollar values are inflation-adjusted to 2019 dollar amounts using the consumer price index
for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and rounded to the nearest one-thousandth dollar. Disparities in 2019
Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3, n.3; see also Ana Hernandez Kent & Lowell Ricketts, Has Wealth
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 together with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 that quickly followed clearly improved the conditions
under which Black Americans live. 26 Those statutes banned many of the racial
barriers to employment, education, housing, and voting in the laws of the states and
customs of businesses. The Civil Rights Act was particularly transformational. But
although the new laws made possible new opportunities, the laws’ impact was entirely
prospective. They did nothing to redress the financial harms that racial discrimination
had inf licted on Black Americans before their enactment. No federal law has
compensated Black families for the century-plus of restrictions on employment and
property ownership, theft of their services, destruction of their property, or the
truncated educations that Jim Crow laws violently imposed upon them.27
Nor did the new laws reverse the economic impact on Black adults in 1964 who
had been denied education or training; union membership, jobs, or credit; or the
opportunity to buy a home in Levittown or rent an apartment in a safe neighborhood
because of their race. Nor did they erase the impact on their baby boomer children of
facing “Whites Only” signs over public drinking fountains in the South or attending
segregated schools in the North at which there were not enough books or desks to go
around. 28 The Black baby boomers of 1964 are the parents of today’s Gen Y, or
Millennials, and Gen Z; the Black adults of 1964 are the grandparents and greatgrandparents.
Even if all racial discrimination had actually ended in 1964, Black baby boomers
started out with a huge deficit in human capital and family wealth.29 They did not
commence their adult lives on a level playing field. The outcome for Black baby
boomers can be seen in Figure 3: In their sixties and seventies, their median net
worth was $46,890, or 14.8 percent of the wealth of their white contemporaries.30
Inequality in America Changed Over Time? Here Are Key Statistics, Fed. Rsrv. Bank St. Louis (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/december/has-wealth-inequality-changed-over-timekey-statistics?print=true.
26. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 42 and 52 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2342 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

27.

Cf. H.R. 40, 117th Cong. (2021) (ordered for amendment Apr. 14, 2021) (introducing legislation to
provide reparations).

28. See, e.g., Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 59–75, 77–91 (2017) (reviewing racially discriminatory

housing practices through the Levittown restrictive covenants). I encountered similar circumstances while
tutoring students at public schools in Camden, New Jersey, from 1966 to 1968.

29. See Nick Fortuna, ‘Stark Inequality’ Points to Retirement Struggles for Many Americans, Barron’s, https://

www.barrons.com/articles/generational-racial-wealth-gap-retirement-struggles-51632154247?tesla=y
(Sept. 21, 2021); Valerie Wilson & William M. Rodgers III, Econ. Pol’y Inst., Black-White
Wage Gaps Expand with Rising Wage Inequality (2016).

30. See infra Figure 3 (illustrating median family wealth for those born between 1943 and 1951); Nine

Charts, supra note 4, (illustrating median family wealth for those born between 1943 and 1951);
Disparities in 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, supra note 3 (illustrating median wealth of white and
Black families in 2019); see also Duke Univ., Bootstraps Are for Black Kids (2015).
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Figure 3 Median Family Wealth for Those Born 1943–1951 by Race31

But as we well know, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not end racial discrimination
any more than Brown v. Board of Education, decided ten years prior, ended public
school segregation.32 Prohibiting discrimination by law or Supreme Court opinion is
one thing. Ending racial discrimination in practice is quite another. Both academic
research and the lived experience of Black Americans make it clear that racial
discrimination continues to this day.33 For example, recent research has confirmed
that over the last twenty-five years there has been little reduction in racially
discriminatory hiring practices.34 Schools are arguably more segregated in 2022 than
they were in 1954 when Brown made de jure segregation illegal.35 Racialized low-ball
appraisals of homes take money from the pockets of Black homeowners. 36 The
31.

Nine Charts, supra note 4.

32.

347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a related historical discussion, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Race and the Law:
The Visible and the Invisible, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 141 (2021–2022).

33.

See, e.g., Shukri Olow, A Qualitative Study of Lived Experiences of Black Women in Leadership Positions
in K–12 Educational Settings 67 (2021) (EdD dissertation, Seattle University) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review) (reporting that Black women in K–12 leadership positions face “race, stereotype,
and gender challenges” not faced by their white counterparts in hiring and employment).

34. See generally Lincoln Quillan et al., Meta-analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in Racial

Discrimination in Hiring over Time, 114 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S., 10,870 (2017).

35.

See Erica Frankenberg et al., Harming Our Common Future: America’s Segregated Schools
65 Years After Brown 5, 21 (2019); Richard D. Marsico, The Intersection of Race, Wealth, and Special
Education: The Role of Structural Inequities in the IDEA, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 207 (2021–2022).

36. See, e.g., Lauren Helper, A Black Couple ‘Erased Themselves’ from Their Home to See If the Appraised Value

Would Go Up. It Did—by Nearly $500,000, S.F. Chron., https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/
Black-Marin-City-couple-sues-appraiser-for-16672840.php (Dec. 5, 2021); What’s Your Home Worth? A
Review of the Appraisal Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Cmty. Dev. & Ins. of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Andre M. Perry, David M. Rubenstein Fellow,
Metropolitan Policy Program, the Brookings Institution); see also Richard Chused, Strategic Thinking
About Racism in American Zoning, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 307 (2021–2022) (examining racialized zoning
and lending practices).
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continuation of insurance and mortgage redlining37 reinforces residential segregation
and depresses the value of homes in majority minority neighborhoods.38 In light of
these realities, it may be shocking but it should not be surprising that today more
than 80 percent of Black families have less wealth than the median white family.39
The racial wealth gap amplifies across generations when we consider the forwardlooking uses to which family wealth can be put—for a down payment on a home, to
cushion a job loss, car breakdown, or an unexpected bill, to start a business, pursue
higher education, or pass down rainy day money to children or grandchildren. In
some important ways, the process is circular. Wealth begets wealth by boosting the
next generation. And the inability of families to improve life chances in these ways
or provide such opportunities for their members limits the likelihood that the next
generation will be able to accumulate greater assets. These are some of the dynamics
that sustain the racial wealth gap.
Economists have identified several data points that together explain the presentday racial wealth gap. For example, in 2012 the lifetime earnings for Black male baby
boomers was 67 percent of that of white male boomers.40 A greater proportion of
Black families are burdened by greater amounts of student debt.41 White families
hold more wealth-producing financial assets than Black families, including more
than six times the liquid retirement savings of Black families.42 White families
receive gifts and inheritances at three times the rate of Black families, which alone
account for 12 percent of the racial wealth gap.43 The rate of homeownership for
white families outpaces that of Black families by about 167 percent.44 The role of
37.

“Mortgage redlining” is the name given to discriminatory lending practices dating back to the 1930s, when
lenders would draw red lines on maps around predominantly Black neighborhoods to claim the area as “high
risk” and deny a mortgage accordingly. Brai Odion-Esene & Rachel Witkowski, What Is Redlining in Real
Estate?, Forbes Advisor (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/mortgages/what-is-redlining/.

38. Caley Horan, Insurance Era 139–66 (2021).
39.

See Weller & Roberts, supra note 23.

40. Nine Charts, supra note 4 (reporting that the lifetime earnings of white male baby boomers to Black male

baby boomers was $2.7 million to $1.8 million in 2012, and for women, it was $1.5 million to $1.3 million).
For more recent data on overall wealth and earnings by race and gender, see Dedrick AsanteMuhammad et al., Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Racial Wealth Snapshot: Women, Men
and the Racial Wealth Divide (2022), which estimates $78,200 median wealth for single white men
compared to $10,100 for single Black men, and $81,200 for single white women compared to $1,700 for
single Black women.

41.

Nine Charts, supra note 4 (presenting the average family student loan debt for those between the ages of
25–55 by year from 1989 to 2016).

42.

Id. (presenting the average family liquid retirement savings by year from 1989 to 2016).

43.

See Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Do Racial Disparities in Private Transfers Help Explain the Racial
Wealth Gap? New Evidence from Longitudinal Data, 51 Demography 949 (2014); Maury Gittleman &
Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth Accumulation, 39 J. Hum. Res. 193 (2004);
Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Urb. Inst., Do Financial Support and Inheritance Contribute
to the Racial Wealth Gap? (2012).

44. See infra Figure 4; Nine Charts, supra note 4.
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each of these factors in building wealth is obvious: Higher measures at each data
point mean that there will be more wealth; lower measures mean there will be less.
Factors such as lower student loan rates and more gifts and inheritances are
associated with tax benefits that enhance wealth. For example, parents and
grandparents who can afford to put money aside in 529 Plans 45 will see college
savings for their families grow tax free.46 Those who make use of these tax advantages
will likely incur less student debt in educating their families. Further, for the lucky
recipient of a gift or inheritance, this addition to personal wealth comes tax free.47
These tax benefits are significant contributors to building wealth for those who can
use them but are in effect paid for by those for whom they are inaccessible.48
B. The Racial Homeownership Gap

Owning one’s own home in the neighborhood of one’s choice has long been
described as the American Dream.49 It is a dream that encompasses many goals. In
addition to providing status, shelter, and stability, it has been a strategy that has enabled
households to build wealth. More accurately, homeownership has disproportionately
enabled more than 70 percent of white households to build wealth with the assistance
of rising housing markets and trillions of dollars in tax benefits while almost 60 percent
of Black families have been left behind.50 These homeownership rates have been
relatively stable since the 1970s.51 However, the gap is growing. In 2020 it was 28.7
45.

I.R.C. § 529. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended unless otherwise noted.
So-called “529 plans” or “qualified tuition plans” are “designed to enourage saving for future education
costs.” An Introduction to 529 Plans, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/
investor-publications/investorpubsintro529htm.html (May 29, 2018).

46. I.R.C. § 529. New York State adds a further wealth enhancing element—an income tax deduction for

donations of up to $10,000 a year for married couples and $5,000 for unmarrieds. Direct Plan Tax
Benefits, Why Choose N Y 529 Direct Plan?, NY’s 529 Coll. Sav. Program, https://www.nysaves.org/
home/why-ny-529-direct-plan/highlights.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).

47.

I.R.C. § 102.

48. See How Tax Laws Disadvantage Black Americans but Subsidize White Americans, PBS NewsHour (May 16,

2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-tax-laws-disadvantage-black-americans-but-subsidizewhite-americans.

49. Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore, Mortgage Lending Discrimination 1 (1999)

(refining the definition of “American Dream” insightfully by adding to its component of homeownership
“in the neighborhood of one’s choice”).

50. Compare Shawn Harrison, How Inequities in U.S. Taxation Can Perpetuate Systemic Racism (Apr. 20,

2021), https://equitablegrowth.org/how-inequities-in-u-s-taxation-can-perpetuate-systemic-racism/
(attributing major tax benefits for whites to their respective incomes), with Vanessa Williamson, Closing
the Racial Wealth Gap Requires Heavy, Progressive Taxation of Wealth, Brookings (Dec. 9, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/closing-the-racial-wealth-gap-requires-heavy-progressive-taxation-ofwealth/ (finding that certain tax policies perpetuate discrimination and exploitation of Blacks).

51.

See U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Second
Quarter (2021); Nine Charts, supra note 4 (reporting that roughly 42 percent of Black families owned
homes versus 68 percent of white families in 2016). The story for Hispanic families has very much
paralleled that of Black families. Nine Charts, supra note 4.
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percent, an increase over the previous two-plus decades.52 The white homeownership
rate grew by 3.3 percent between 1994 and 2019, while the Black homeownership rate
declined by 0.2 percent.53 And it is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic caused a
disproportionate decline in Black homeownership.54 That is what happened in the
Great Recession of 2008 when white homeownership declined by 2.43 percent but
Black homeownership fell by 9.07 percent.55
Figure 4 Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 1976–201656

It took about one hundred years for Black families to reach peak levels of
homeownership.57 In 1870, five years after the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery
throughout the United States,58 about 8 percent of households headed by Black men of
prime working age owned their own homes.59 At that time, some 57 percent of households
headed by white men were homeowners.60 The racial homeownership gap was 49 percent.
By 1900, the homeownership rate for Black households had more than doubled, while
52.

Lawrence Yun et al., Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Snapshot of Race and Home Buying in America
7 (2022).

53.

Jung Hyun Choi, Breaking Down the Black-White Homeownership Gap, Urb. Inst. (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/breaking-down-black-white-homeownership-gap.

54. Sharon Cornelissen & Alexander Hermann, A Triple Pandemic? The Economic Impacts of COVID-19

Disproportionately Affect Black and Hispanic Households, Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. Harv. Univ. (July
7, 2020), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/a-triple-pandemic-the-economic-impacts-of-covid-19disproportionately-affect-black-and-hispanic-households.

55.

White homeownership fell from 75 percent to 73.1 percent. See Choi, supra note 53. Black homeownership
declined from 47.4 percent to 42.1 percent. Id.

56. See Nine Charts, supra note 4.
57.

See infra Figure 5.

58. U.S. Const. amend. XII, § 1.
59.

William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership from the End of the Civil War to the
Present, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 355, 357 (2011) [hereinafter Civil War to Present].

60. Id.
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that of households headed by white men dropped to roughly 48 percent.61 The racial
homeownership gap was reduced to 26 percent.62 This leap in Black homeownership
likely reflects the new opportunities to own property and the fruits of one’s own labor
that Reconstruction brought to the formerly enslaved.63 But the sharp ascent stopped
there, coincidental with the violent end of Reconstruction64 and enactment of Jim Crow
laws.65 Further progress was not made until the 1940s, with Black homeownership rates
peaking in the 1980s before declining again to today’s levels.66
What is not visible from this homeownership data, however, is the role that
exceedingly generous tax benefits have played since the enactment of the first modern
income tax law in 1913 in creating wealth and intergenerational advantage for the
families of homeowners.67
Figure 5 Rates of Owner-Occupancy, 1870–2007:
Households Headed by Males, Ages 25–64, in Labor Force, Not in School68

61.

Id. By then, the Black homeownership rate increased to 22 percent, allowing the racial gap in
homeownership to drop by about 23 percent. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 355 (noting that the majority of Blacks in the postbellum South could only rely on becoming a farm

owner through moving up the agricultural ladder due to their own or their parents’ previous status as slaves).

64. Gregory P. Downs & Kate Masur, Nat’l Park Serv., The Era of Reconstruction, 1861–1900:

A National Historic Landmarks Theme Study 1–8 (2017).

65.

Dedrick Asante-Muhammad et al., Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., 60% Black
Homeownership: A Radical Goal for Black Wealth Development 5, 13 (2021).

66. See infra Figure 5.
67.

See U.S. Const. amend. XVI; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§
163(h), 164(a)); see also Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916) (holding that the Sixteenth
Amendment provides a power to levy an income tax not subject to the regulation of apportionment
applicable to all other direct taxes); William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership, 1900
to 1990, at 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7277, 1999) (adding that whites benefitted
disproportionately from the tax code because Black Americans had lower taxable income, were less likely to
be homeowners, and had lower housing value than whites).

68. Civil War to Present, supra note 59.
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III.	TAX BENEFITS CONFERRED ON HOMEOWNERSHIP PERPETUATE THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP

Racial disparities in homeownership have been one of the most significant factors
contributing to the racial wealth gap. And the trillions of dollars in tax benefits that
are bestowed upon homeowners have themselves been an important factor in the
creation and distribution of wealth. It is important to understand both the scale of
these tax subsidies and the mechanisms of tax law that create them.
Taxation is ultimately a zero-sum game. Tax rates are set to produce the required
amount of revenue assuming a given base of taxable income. If the taxable income
base is reduced by giving one taxpayer a deduction or tax credit or exempting them
from taxation altogether, then the tax burden on everyone else will have to be
increased to make up the difference.
For example, if the required amount of tax revenue is $100 and taxpayers A and B
each have $500 of taxable income, a tax rate of 10 percent will produce the necessary
$100 in revenue from the combined A-plus-B tax base of $1,000. A and B will each
pay $50 in tax. But if A is allowed a deduction of $200 and B is not, then A’s taxable
income will be reduced to $300, and the taxable income base will fall to $800. At the
10 percent tax rate, only $80 in tax revenue will be produced in the aggregate. To
produce the needed $100 in tax revenue, the tax rate must be raised to 12.5 percent. A
will then pay $37.50 in tax ($300 x 12.5 percent), saving $12.50 when compared to A’s
prior tax bill of $50. But B will have to pay $62.50 ($500 x 12.5 percent), which is
$12.50 more than what B owed before A was allowed a $200 deduction. It is a headsI-win, tails-you-lose result for A. For B it is simply a lose-lose.
The examination of tax expenditures below illustrates the scale of wealth building
that tax benefits have provided to homeowners over the past decades at the expense
of taxpayers who do not own their own homes. An explication of the tax structures
that have created present conditions follows.
A. Tax Expenditure Budget

Tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing in 2022 alone are expected to exceed
$213.7 billion in lost revenue.69 This information is readily available because since
1974, the U.S. Treasury has been required to publish a list of the revenue losses
attributable to tax benefits that are unrelated to basic principles of taxation such as
ability to pay.70 Called the tax expenditure “budget,” it was the idea of tax professor
69. Calculations by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts based on projected 2022 tax expenditures.

See Off. Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t Treasury Tax Expenditures (2022) [hereinafter 2022 Tax
Expenditures]; Ann F. Thomas, Table of Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing with
Constant Dollars 1974–2017, at 8 (Apr. 22, 2022) [hereinafter Owner-Occupied Housing Table]
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

70. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 203, 88 Stat.

297, 512 (1974); see also 2022 Tax Expenditures, supra note 69, at 1. Tax expenditure reports and
tables are accessible online. See, e.g., Budget of the United States Government, Special
Analyses, FRASER, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/budget-united-states-government-specialanalyses-126?browse=1960s [hereinafter Expenditure Tables 1976–1990] (last visited May 5, 2022)
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Stanley S. Surrey when he served as assistant secretary of the Treasury in the 1960s.71
Its purpose is to create greater transparency in policymaking and the use of federal
government resources.72 The concept is that a decision by Congress to give a tax
credit for, say, the purchase of an electric car, has the same fiscal impact as a decision
to authorize the Deparment of Transportation to send the electric car–buyer a check.
That is, it reduces the resources available for other parts of the federal budget.
While tax expenditures are equivalent to the direct programmatic outlays by the
federal government included in the federal budget each year, they do not have a line in
the federal budget because they are delivered through the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) as a reduction in individual or business tax liability. Less visible politically,73
there may be less public scrutiny and hence less accountability for the policy decisions
they effectuate. Indeed, once embedded in the tax law, these expenditures can become
separated from wider political discourse about the policies they serve. This has been
the situation with respect to the tax benefits of homeownership until very recently.
The trillions of dollars of benefits conferred on homeowners are submerged in the
intricacies of the IRC and rarely added up for public discussion.74 To put the $213.7
billion in tax expenditures for homeowners in perspective, the fiscal year 2022 budget
request for the entire U.S. Navy was only slightly smaller, at $211.7 billion.75
Historically, total tax expenditures for owner-occupied housing have been the
most expensive category in the list of tax subsidies.76 The high to date was in 2017,
the year before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) took effect to cut back some of
(go to “Statistical Data” and then click “Tax Expenditures”); Budget of the United States
Government, FRASER, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54 [hereinafter Expenditure Tables
1991–1994] (last visited May 5, 2022) (click “ALL ISSUES” and then go to left margin and click
desired decade (e.g., “1990s”) and then click desired fiscal year (e.g., “Fiscal Year 1992”)); Budget of
the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives, FRASER, https://fraser.stlouisfed.
org/title/budget-united-states-government-analytical-perspectives-425?browse=1990s [hereinafter
Expenditure Tables 1995–2023] (last visited May 5, 2022) (click “ALL ISSUES” and then go to left
margin and click desired decade (e.g., “2010s”) and then click desired fiscal year (e.g., “Fiscal Year
2018”)).
71.

Stanley S. Surrey, 74; Taxation Law Expert, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1984, B7.

72. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 491–98 (1985) (reviewing

Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985)).

73. See Tax Pol’y Ctr., Briefing Book 112–16 (2020) [hereinafter Briefing Book] (explaining the

political appeal of tax expenditures and the controversies surrounding it).

74.

See infra pp. 259–69. Even prominent tax law commentators do not usually present the issues from the
total tax expenditure perspective. See, e.g., Dorothy Brown, The Whiteness of Wealth 206–210
(2022); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform, 135 Tax Notes 181, 182–86 (2012).

75. Off. of the Under Sec’y of Def. (Comptroller)/Chief Fin. Off., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense

Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request
app. A tbl.A-2 (2021); see sources cited supra note 69 and accompanying text (estimating $213.7 billion
in tax expenditures for homeowners).

76. 2022 Tax Expenditures, supra note 69. Four tax expenditures for homeowners are now reported by

Treasury: the home mortgage interest deduction (HMID), real property tax deduction, exclusion of
gain on sale of principal residence, and exclusion of imputed rental icome.
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those tax benefits.77 At that point, federal tax expenditures for homeowners totaled
approximately $300.9 billion.78 From 2007 through 2016, the tax expenditure budget
for owner-occupied housing averaged $227.8 billion per year.79 At that rate, one year
of homeowner tax expenditures could fund the federal judiciary’s budget for twenty.80
In the zero-sum game that is tax policy, this means that non-homeowners are
paying more tax so that homeowners can pay less.81 Renters, including close to 60
percent of Black American households and nearly 52 percent of “Hispanic- or Latinoled households,” are subsidizing the American Dream for others at the expense of
building their own assets and financial well-being.82
B. Eight Tax Breaks for Homeowners

Eight different federal tax benefits are associated with homeownership. Among
the most familiar are the home mortgage interest deduction (HMID), the deduction
for real property tax, the exclusion of up to $250,000 ($500,000 for married couples)
in gains on the sale of a principal residence, and the taxation of any remaining profit
at long-term capital gains rates.83 Relatedly but perhaps less familiar is the use of the
home as collateral for tax free borrowing.84 Another tax benefit is the step up in basis
upon the death of the homeowner which entirely eliminates capital gains for the
heirs.85 Moreover, with unified estate and gift credit at $12.06 million for individuals
($24.12 million for married couples),86 the family home is virtually exempt from the
77.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).

78. Calculation by author based on 2018 tax expenditures and adjusted to constant dollars (income after

adjustment for inflation) for January 1, 2022, using an inflation calculator. Owner-Occupied Housing
Table, supra note 69; see Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Analytical
Perspectives: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2018, at 130–31 tbl.13-1 (2017)
[hereinafter FY2018 Budget]; CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau Lab. Stats., https://data.bls.gov/
cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited May 1, 2022).

79. Owner-Occupied Housing Table, supra note 69; FY2018 Budget, supra note 78. Calculation by author

and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts.

80. Calculation by author based on a ten-year projection of the judicial branch budget at approximately

$101.9 billion. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Table 21-1. Federal
Budget by Agency and Account, FY 2022 President’s Budget Policy 23 (2021).

81.

See Jenny Schuetz, Under US Housing Policies, Homeowners Mostly Win, While Renters Mostly Lose,
Brookings (July 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housing-policies-homeownersmostly-win-while-renters-mostly-lose/.

82. Drew DeSilver, As National Eviction Ban Expires, a Look at Who Rents and Who Owns in the U.S., Pew

Rsch. Ctr. (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/02/as-national-evictionban-expires-a-look-at-who-rents-and-who-owns-in-the-u-s/; see Schuetz, supra note 81.

83. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 164(a)(1), 121(b); see § 1(h).
84. See discussion infra pp. 263–64.
85. I.R.C. § 1014; see discussion infra pp. 265–66.
86. Rev. Proc. 2021-45, 2021-48 I.R.B. 764.
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federal wealth transfer taxes. But the most valuable and least understood tax benefit
for homeowners is the exclusion from tax of their imputed rental income.87
		

1. Thes HMID and the Real Property Tax Deduction

Both the home mortgage interest deduction and the deduction for real property
tax have been features of the federal tax system since 1913.88 The HMID allows
homeowners to reduce their taxable income by deducting mortgage interest incurred
on up to two homes.89 Comparatively, the real property tax deduction falls under the
state and local tax deduction umbrella, which allows homeowners to reduce their
taxable income up to a certain aggregate amount.90 Corresponding both deductions
is a drain on the tax revenue that the government must offset through some other
means.
Prior to 1987, interest on home mortgages of any amount and incurred at any
time and for any purpose (other than for the purpose of purchasing tax-free municipal
bonds) was fully deductible.91 Since then, the deduction has generally been limited to
interest on the first $1 million ($750,000 for 2018–2025)92 of mortgage debt on up to
two homes.93 In less than fifty years, going back only to 1974, before which the tax
expenditure numbers were not publicly available, the total revenue loss from the
HMID alone has been approximately $3.594 trillion, or an average of about $73.35
billion per year.94
87.

See discussion infra pp. 266–69.

88. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (now codified at I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 164(a)).
89. Mark P. Keightley, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11063, 2019 Tax Filing Season (2018 Tax Year): The

Mortgage Interest Deduction (2019); see also Scott Eastman & Anna Tyger, Tax Found., No.
671, The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 2 (2019).

90. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 164; Sean Lowry, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11091, 2019 Tax Filing Season (2018

Tax Year): Itemized Deductions (2019); see also State and Local Tax (SALT) Deduction, Tax Found.
[hereinafter SALT Deduction], https://taxfoundation.org/tax-basics/salt-deduction/ (last visited May 1,
2022).

91.

Staff of the J. Comm. on Tax’n, 99th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, at 262–70 (J. Comm. Print 1987).

92.

For a general understanding of the HMID, see Julia Kagan, Mortgage Interest Deduction, Investopedia,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/home-mortgage-interest.asp (Sept. 28, 2021). The TCJA reduced
this limit to $750,000, effective 2018–2025. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11043,
131 Stat. 2054, 2086 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F)).

93.

In 1986, HMID was limited to the interest on the amount of the loan that did not exceed the basis of
the principal residence and one other home. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 100
Stat. 2085, 2244, 2247 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(d) and (h)). In 1988, the HMID was limited to the
interest on the first $1 million of mortgage loans used for the acquisition or renovation of homes and
home equity loans of up to $100,000. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 10102. The TCJA
set a $750,000 limit for mortgages created in the years 2018 through 2025. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 § 11043.

94. Calculations by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts. See 2022 Tax Expenditures, supra note

69. From time to time there have been general limitations on itemized deductions overall. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 68.
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Likewise, for more than one hundred years the deduction for real property tax
was unlimited.95 Between 1974 and 2017, the real property tax deduction for owneroccupied homes resulted in a revenue loss of approximately $1.257 trillion, or an
average of about $28.57 billion a year. 96 After the 2017 TCJA limited federal income
tax deductions for all state and local taxes paid to $10,000 per federal tax return and
nearly doubled the standard deduction, the number of tax returns claiming a
deduction for real property tax fell dramatically. Yet in 2020, the revenue loss from
this deduction still hit $6.450 billion.97
Although all homeowners are permitted to claim both the HMID and the real
property tax deduction as itemized deductions, most do not. Since 1944, taxpayers
have had the opportunity to choose the standard deduction if it is larger than the
sum of all of their itemized deductions—that is, larger than the sum of their HMID
plus their real property tax deduction—in any given year.98 Thus in 2017 when the
standard deduction for a married couple was $12,700, about 31 percent of individual
tax returns were itemized.99 Approximately 22 percent of returns filed claimed the
HMID, and 13 percent claimed the deduction for real property tax.100 With the near
doubling of the standard deduction in the 2017 TCJA,101 the number of filers who
claimed HMID and real property tax deductions as itemizers has fallen off by about
60 percent.102 Tax expenditures for the HMID fell to $25.13 billion in 2019, less

95. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 11042.
96. Calculations by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts. See Owner-Occupied Housing Table,

supra note 69.

97.

Calculations by author based on 2020 tax expenditures and adjusted to constant dollars for January 1,
2022, using an inf lation calculator. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President,
Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2020, at 174–76
tbl.16-1 (2019); CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 78.

98. I.R.C. § 63(b); Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: The Love-Hate Relationship with the Standard

Deduction, Tax Hist. Project (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/
FD4865793851996185257D1B0041C875?OpenDocument.

99. Adrian Dungan et al., IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, Pub. No. 4801, Individual Income Tax

Returns Line Item Estimates 2017, at 7–8 (2019) [hereinafter 2017 IRS Pub. No. 4801]; Rev. Proc.
2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.

100. 2017 IRS Pub. No. 4801, supra note 99 (providing Schedule A itemized deduction filings for 2017).
101. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 115th Cong., General Explanation of Public Law 115-97, at 67 (J.

Comm. Print 2018). For 2018, the standard deduction increased to $24,000 for joint filers, up from
$12,700 for 2017. Id. For single filers and married filers filing separately, the deduction amount
increased to $12,000, up from $6,350. Id. For heads of households, the deduction was $18,000, up from
$9,350. Id.

102. Id. at 23; Adrian Dungan & Michael Parisi, IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, Pub. No. 4801,

Individual Income Tax Returns Line Item Estimates 2018, at 7–8 (2020) (providing line item
estimates and Schedule A itemized deductions). Compare id. at 34 (showing that 13.7 billion HMID
and 15.4 billion real property tax deductions were claimed in 2018), with 2017 IRS Pub. No. 4801,
supra note 99, at 32 (showing that 33.4 billion HMID and 39.1 billion real property tax deductions were
claimed in 2017).
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than half of the $68.61 billion in 2017; the revenue loss for the real property tax
deduction declined from $33.71 billion to $6.01 billion.103
The wealth-generating mechanism of the HMID and real property tax deduction
is simply that they allow the homeowner to pay each of these expenses with pre-tax
income while the tenant must pay her rent from after-tax income. For example, if a
residential tenant pays $1,000 a month in rent, it will take $13,333 of pre-tax income
to cover her $12,000 annual rent bill if she is in the lowest bracket (10 percent) and
$19,048 if she is in the top bracket (37 percent).104 On the other hand, a homeowner
paying $1,000 monthly for mortgage interest and real property tax only needs
$12,000 of pre-tax income to cover those expenses because the HMID and real
property tax deduction remove that $12,000 from her taxable income. If she is in the
10 percent bracket, these deductions save her $1,333; if in the 37 percent bracket, she
saves $7,048.105
The $1,333 or $7,048 tax savings for the homeowner constitutes lost tax revenue.
Aggregated from all taxpayers who enjoy them, these subsidies comprise the tax
expenditures reported by the Treasury. In the 109 years since 1913, these tax
expenditures have added trillions to the family wealth of homeowners.
		

2. Tax Free Borrowing

Another tax benefit that contributes to building the wealth of homeowners is the
opportunity to raise cash from their homes on a tax-free basis without selling. This
can be accomplished by using the home as collateral for a new loan. When the
homeowner has sufficient equity in the home, lenders may be willing to take a second
mortgage and provide financing for a purpose unrelated to the home, such as starting
a new business, paying for a child’s education, or investing in the stock market. The
interest on such a financing may or may not be deductible depending on the use of
the funds.106 But the real tax benefit is that although the borrowing itself puts money
into the hands of the homeowner, the amount borrowed is not taxed if it is a bona
fide loan.107 In this manner, the equity in the family home can be monetized tax free
103. Calculation by author based on 2017 and 2019 tax expenditures and adjusted to constant dollars for

January 1, 2022, using an inflation calculator. Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Tax Expenditures 21–22 tbl.1 (2015) (providing 2017 estimate); Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 22–23 tbl.1 (2017) (providing 2019 estimate).

104. Calculations by author based on the tax gross-up formula: n = x/(1-tax rate), thus 12,000/(1-10%) =

$13,333 or $12,000/(1-37%) = $19,048. Adam Hayes, Gross-Up, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/g/gross-up.asp (Mar. 4, 2021).

105. Calculations by author based on the tax gross-up formula.
106. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (listing categories of personal interest expense that individual taxpayers will be

allowed to deduct).

107. Michael J. Graetz et al., Federal Income Taxation 177 (8th ed. 2018). A “bona fide loan” or

“bona fide debt” is defined as “a debt which arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid
and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money.” Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c)
(2022); see also Memorandum from the Branch 1 Chief, Off. of the Assoc. Chief Couns. to the Assoc.
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without selling the property. This tax benefit is not included in the tax expenditure
budget at the present time.108
		

3. Tax Benefits on the Sale of the Principal Residence

In contrast, two other tax benefits for homeowners are only applicable when the
home is sold. Most visible are the various mechanisms that Congress created over the
past seventy or so years to enable homeowners to sell their principal residences
without paying tax on the gain.
Beginning in 1951, when the post–World War II baby boom was in full swing
and white f light to the suburbs was beginning,109 Congress made the sale of a
principal residence tax free to the extent that the proceeds of sale were rolled over
into the purchase of a new principal residence.110 In 1964, it added section 121 which
provided an exclusion of gain for taxpayers age sixty-five and older who did not want
to rollover their entire proceeds of sale into a new home.111 Congress later enlarged
and extended the exclusion to those fifty-five and over.112 And in 1997, Congress
scrapped the rollover approach altogether and enacted the current section 121 system,
which allows qualifying homeowners of all ages to exclude up to $250,000 ($500,000
for married couples) of the gain on the sale of their principal residence.113
Under the current section 121 scheme, married homeowners who exclude the
maximum of a gain of $500,000 on the sale of their principal residence will save
$119,000.114 There is no requirement to reinvest in another principal residence as

Area Couns. 7 (Sept. 30, 2004) (on file with author) (“Generally, whether a transaction for federal
income tax purposes constitutes a bona fide loan is a factual question . . . .”).
108. Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures (2021) (providing 2022

estimate).

109. For more on zoning law and “white flight,” see Chused, supra note 33, at 307.
110. I.R.C. of 1954, ch. 736, § 1016(a)(7), 68A Stat. 3, 300 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the

I.R.C.). What became section 1034 in the 1954 I.R.C. was first added to the 1939 I.R.C. as section
112(n) by Public Law 83-591 in 1951.
		The rollover in theory was a deferral because it required the basis of the new home to be reduced
by the amount of gain deferred. I.R.C. § 1061(a)(7). But if the taxpayer held the home until death, the
deferred gain was eliminated by the section 1014 basis step up to fair market value. Id. § 1014.
111. I.R.C. § 121.
112. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 404(c)(6), 92 Stat. 2763, 2869–70 (amending I.R.C.

§ 121); see also Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 95th Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue
Act of 1978, at 255–57 (J. Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter General Explanation of the Revenue
Act of 1978].

113. I.R.C. § 121; see also Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 105th Cong., General Explanation of Tax

Legislation Enacted in 1997, at 45 (J. Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter General Explanation of
Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997].

114. Calculation by author based on the $500,000 exclusion which would have otherwise been taxed at the

top long-term capital gains rate of 20 percent as of 2022, in addition to the 3.8 percent tax added on by
section 1411. I.R.C. § 1411.
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there had been under prior law.115 The homeowner is free to put the $500,000 or
$250,000 to whatever welfare-enhancing use they choose. For 2022, it is estimated
that the tax expenditure for the section 121 exclusion will be $41.8 billion.116 Since
1974, the section 1034 rollover benefit and exclusions together have cost some $1.42
trillion in lost revenue.117
The second benefit on the sale of a principal residence is that any gain not
excluded by one provision or another is taxed at the preferential, lower, long-term
capital gains rates. With the top rate on ordinary income now at 37 percent,118 the
23.8 percent maximum offered by the long-term rate represents a substantial tax
savings.119 The preferentially lower long-term capital gains tax rate is considered a
tax expenditure but the U.S. Treasury’s annual report does not break out the revenue
losses attributable to the sale of homes.120
		

4. Two Tax Benefits on the Death of the Homeowner

Although it may seem macabre to frame it this way, the death of the homeowner
gives rise to two other tax benefits related to the home. The first is the elimination
of unrealized taxable gains for the heirs and estate. Upon the death of the homeowner
the basis for measuring taxable gain on sale of the home is marked to market,121 or,
in other words, is adjusted to fair market value.122 This is a substantial tax benefit if
115. Compare James C. Smith & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Federally Deferred Income: The Interstate

Dimension, 44 Tax L. Rev. 349, 352 (1989) (“Under [former section] 1034, recognition of gain on a sale
of a principal residence is deferred if another residence of equal or greater value is purchased within two
years from the date of the sale.”), with I.R.C. § 121(a) (“Gross income shall not include gain from the
sale or exchange of property if . . . such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the
taxpayer’s principal residence for periods aggregating [two] years or more.”); see also General
Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997, supra note 113, at 54–56.

116. Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures tbl.1 (2021).
117. Expenditure Tables 1976–1990, supra note 70; Expenditure Tables 1991–1994, supra note 70;

Expenditure Tables 1995–2023, supra note 70. Calculations by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar
amounts.

118. I.R.C. § 1(j).
119. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1(j), 1411. Long-term capital gains rates apply only if the home was owned for more

than a year. I.R.C. § 1222(3). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set 28 percent as the top tax rate on all
income and eliminated the preferential long-term capital gains rates. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.). It was revived in 1993 when the top rate
on ordinary income rose to 39.6 percent. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and
26 U.S.C.).

120. See, e.g., 2022 Tax Expenditures.
121. See Alicia Tuovila, Mark to Market (MTM), Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/

marktomarket.asp (Dec. 31, 2021) (“Mark to market is an accounting practice that involves adjusting
the value of an asset to reflect its value as determined by current market conditions.”).

122. I.R.C. § 1014. For comparison, if the testator sells the home while they are alive, they will be taxed on

any gain recognized, measured by the difference between the adjusted basis and the amount realized.
See § 1001. The adjustment to fair market value on death eliminates the unrealized gain.
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the home has appreciated in value since its purchase—it eliminates any taxable gain
for the heirs.
The second tax benefit on the death of the homeowner is that, although the full
value of the home is included in the decedent’s estate and in theory is subject to the
estate tax, with the current $12.06 million gift, estate, and generation-skipping tax
exemption ($24.12 million for married couples),123 very few estates and family homes
are actually subject to the federal estate tax.124 For context, only about 1,900 of the
estates of some 2.8 million people who died in 2020 were expected to be taxable.125
The portions of the tax expenditures involved here that are attributable to homes are
not separately reported in the U.S. Treasury’s annual tax expenditure budget.126
		

5. Imputed Rental Income

The exclusion from taxation of the net imputed rental income127 from owneroccupied housing is the largest of all tax subsidies for homeowners but the least
understood and the least discussed. This exclusion alone is expected to result in
$130.88 billion in lost tax revenue in 2022.128 The U.S. Treasury projects it will
result in $1.6 trillion in foregone tax revenue from 2022 through 2031,129 almost
enough to fund the Food and Nutrition Service for ten years.130
All homeowners receive this tax benefit whether they claim the standard
deduction or itemize and whether or not they are aware of it. Indeed, the exclusion of
imputed rental income is so deeply embedded in the concept of homeownership in
the United States that very few homeowners today are aware of it. Yet it has been a
feature of the federal income tax since the Revenue Act of 1913.131

123. Rev. Proc. 2021-45, 2021-48 I.R.B. 764.
124. See Briefing Book, supra note 73, at 406.
125. Id.
126. See Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 3–20 (2015) [hereinafter

2017 Tax Expenditures] (tax expenditure budget for FY2017); Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 3–21 (2016) [hereinafter 2018 Tax Expenditures] (tax expenditure
budget for FY2018); Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 3–20
(2017) [hereinafter 2019 Tax Expenditures] (tax expenditure budget for FY2019).

127. In this article “net imputed rental income” is used interchangeably with “imputed rental income.” “Net”

in this case means imputed rental income after the subtraction of expenses that would be deductible if
rented to a third party.

128. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Off. of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures 32 tbl.3 (2021) (ranking

estimated income tax expenditures for fiscal years 2021 to 2023 by total).

129. See id. at 22 tbl.1 (listing estimates of total income tax expenditures for fiscal years 2021 to 2031).
130. See Federal Spending by Category and Agency, Data Lab, https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-

finance-guide/spending/categories/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2022) (choose “Income Security” from chart)
(reporting $168.1 billion spent on food and nutrition assistance in 2021).

131. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G) 38 Stat. 114, 172–74 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

the I.R.C.) (silent on rent deduction and imputed rental income).

266

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

The Treasury Department only started reporting the revenue loss from the
exclusion of net imputed rental income in 2004, although this tax benefit goes back
to the beginning of the modern income tax.132 For each of the past six years, this
exclusion has been the second largest tax expenditure, one spot behind the exclusion
from employee income of employer contributions to health insurance premiums.133
The exclusion of imputed rental income has cost approximately $1.57 trillion in lost
tax revenue since 2004.134
But what is “imputed rental income”? The analysis is as follows. The homeowner’s
home is a capital asset that can command income for its “use,” that is, its rental value.
Economists describe it as “owner-occupied housing.”135 If the owner rents it out to a
third party, the owner will receive actual rental income which will be taxable to her.
If the owner chooses to live in it herself, she is still enjoying the financial benefit of
its rental value, consuming it herself rather than using it to generate market income.
The value of the free rent is the imputed rental income. Among economists and
policymakers, the rental value of owner-occupied housing is so widely recognized as
a financial asset that it is included in determining eligibility for welfare benefits.136
For example, if X owns a house and rents it to Y for $10,000 a year and Y rents the
house that she owns to Z for $10,000, both X and Y will have $10,000 of rental income
subject to tax. If instead Y decides to live in the house that she owns, she is in effect
renting it to herself for free. Economic theory would say that Y has “imputed rental
income”—that the decision to rent it to herself instead of to Z does not alter the value
that she receives from her investment in the house. The homeowner is simply collecting
the $10,000 return on her investment in the form of free rent. And yet, under current
income tax law, that $10,000 investment return is excluded from taxation.137
Despite the force of this analysis, modern tax systems rarely attempt to tax the
imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing with the result being that homeowners

132. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of

the United States Government Fiscal Year 2004, at 140 tbl.3 (2003).

133. Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 33 tbl.3 (2015) (tax

expenditure budget for FY2016); 2017 Tax Expenditures, supra note 126, at 34 tbl.3; 2018 Tax
Expenditures, supra note 126, at 34 tbl.3; 2019 Tax Expenditures, supra note 126, at 33 tbl.3; Off.
of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 40 tbl.3 (2020) (providing 2021
estimate); Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 33 tbl.3 (2021)
(providing 2022 estimate).

134. Calculation by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts. Expenditure Tables 1995–2023, supra

note 70.

135. Cf. U.S. Census, Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, First Quarter 2022

(2022).

136. U.S. Dep’t of Com., Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Chapter 12: Rental Income of Persons 9 (2022).
137. See Steve R. Johnson, Don’t Tax Imputed Income from Owner-Occupied Houses, A.B.A. New Quarterly

Section on Tax’n, Winter 2013, 17, 17 (emphasizing that U.S. income tax excludes imputed rental
income).
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enjoy a large and almost invisible tax subsidy.138 In recent years, however, as concerns
about income inequality have grown,139 there is renewed interest in understanding the
scope and impact of this sizable tax subsidy for homeowners.140 It is notably regressive;
the wealthiest benefit the most. Families with the most expensive homes typically
have higher incomes and are in higher tax brackets. The exclusion of $100,000 of
imputed rental income for someone in the top 37 percent bracket will save them
$37,000 in tax. For someone in the 20 percent bracket, it will save only $20,000.141
And once again, it is a subsidy for homeowners paid for by renters.
Perhaps surprisingly, the inequity of allowing net imputed rental income from
owner-occupied housing to escape taxation was recognized and addressed in U.S. tax
law in the nineteenth century, in the Civil War income tax laws.142 In the Act of
March 3, 1863, Congress created a deduction for the amount of residential rent
“actually paid” by tenants as an alternative to attempting to tax the imputed rental
income from owner-occupied homes.143 Commissioner of Internal Revenue Joseph J.
Lewis vehemently argued for repealing the rent deduction and taxing imputed rental
income itself, but to no avail.144 Indeed, in the Revenue Act of June 30, 1864,
138. See, e.g., Serena Fatica & Doris Prammer, Housing and the Tax System 12 n.6 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working

Paper No. 2087, 2017) (“In the Netherlands and Luxembourg the imputed rental income is taxed, but at a
very low level.”); see also id. at 22 tbl.4.

139. See James R. Hines, Jr., Income Inequality, Progressive Taxation, and Tax Expenditures, in The Political

Economy of Inequality 145–66 (Sisay Asefa & Wei-Chiao Huang eds., 2020) (discussing growing
concerns about income inequality in the United States).

140. See Eur. Comm’n, Tax Reforms in EU Member States: Tax Policy Challenges for Economic

Growth and Fiscal Responsibility 81–86 (2012); Bruce Bartlett, Taxing Homeowners as if They Were
Landlords, N.Y. Times: Economix (Sept. 3, 2013), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/
taxing-homeowners-as-if-they-were-landlords/.

141. See generally Nina Chien & Suzanne Macartney, What Happens When People Increase Their

Earnings? Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Low-Income Households (2019) (comparing
marginal tax rates among various households).

142. See Richard Goode, Imputed Rent of Owner-Occupied Dwellings Under the Income Tax, 15 J. Fin. 504, 504

(1960) (stating that imputed rental income has never been included in the base federal income tax); Joan
Ruhtenberg, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Homeowners and Renters: A Proposed Solution, 12
Ind. L. Rev. 583, 584 (1979) (footnotes omitted) (“Under the Civil War income tax laws, tenants were
allowed to deduct rent, and homeowners were allowed to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes.”).

143. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 74, § 11, 12 Stat. 713, 723; Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J.

Econ. 416, 432 (1894); Internal Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82. The tenant’s
rent deduction also appears as one of the permitted deductions on Civil War–era income tax forms. See
1862 Federal Income Tax Return, TaxAnalysts (Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.
nsf/ArtWeb/9134D0498E7C820085256E4400040844?OpenDocument.

144. Off. of Internal Revenue, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Report of the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue on the Operations of the Internal Revenue System for the Year Ending
June 30, 1863, at 11 (1864).
I am unable to see why a man who consumes his income should not be taxed for it as
well as one who saves it, nor why one who lives in his own house should not be taxed on
its rental value, as much as if he let it to another and put the rent in his purse.

Off. of Internal Revenue, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Report of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the Operations of the Internal Revenue System for the Year Ending
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Congress continued the rent deduction and explicitly provided that “the rental value
of any homestead used or occupied by any person or by his family, in his own right or
in the right of his wife, shall not be included and assessed as part of his income.”145
Homeowners were not taxed on their imputed rental income and renters were given
rough justice through the rent deduction.
Since the Act of June 30, 1864, federal income tax law has been silent on the subjects
of taxing imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing and allowing deductions
for residential renters, leaving homeowners untaxed and renters without a compensating
adjustment.146 Edwin R. A. Seligman, the leading American tax theorist and proponent
of the income tax, described this policy posture as “manifestly an injustice.”147
		

6. In Summary

Perhaps surprisingly, at this point it is not possible to be precise about how many
white families and how many Black American families have claimed the HMID or the
real property tax deduction, or whether one demographic over another has taken
advantage of the exclusions of gains on the sale of their homes. This is because the
Internal Revenue Service does not collect information about the race of taxpayers.148
But it is clear that all homeowners benefit from the exclusion of imputed rental income
and that some 70 percent of white families are enriched by this policy, while almost 60
percent of Black families are paying higher taxes to make up for the lost revenue.149
Clearly a lose-lose situation indeed when it comes to narrowing the racial wealth gap.

June 30, 1864, at 13 (1865); see also Hill, supra note 143, at 433 (“[T]he deduction . . . for rent actually
paid ought to be fixed, so that owners and renters should enjoy equal privileges under the law.”).
145. Internal Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223 § 117.
146. Revenue Act of 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256. Congress allowed the last of the Civil War income tax acts

to expire in 1872 and it was not until 1894 that another income tax was enacted, though without the
return of the rent deduction or mention of imputed rental income. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28
Stat. 509. It was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. within a year of its
enactment. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The Revenue Act of 1913 was then enacted after ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment cleared away the constitutional impediment at issue in Pollock. See Revenue Act
of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.); Edwin R. A.
Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 625 (1894) [hereinafter Seligman 1894]; Edwin R. A.
Seligman, The Income Tax 512 (A.M. Kelly 2d ed. 1970) (1914).

147. Seligman 1894, supra note 146, at 625. For a summary of Seligman’s achievements, see E.R.A. Seligman,

Economist, 78, Dies, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1939, at O26.

148. See generally Jeremy Bearer-Friendly, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data,

73 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2019) (discussing the impact of government access to information about the race and
ethnicity of taxpayers); Benjamin H. Harris & Lucie Parker, The Mortgage Interest Deduction
Across Zip Codes 2–7 (2014) (analyzing mortgage interest characteristics using zip code data). President
Biden has ordered the creation of an Equitable Data Working Group to address the problem that many
“federal datasets are not disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender, disability, income, veteran status, or
other key demographic variables.” Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).

149. See discussion supra Section III.B(5).
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Figure 6 Tax Expenditures for Homeownership (2022 dollars in billions): Summary, 1974–2022150

2022

1974–2022

2020–2030

HMID

26.17

Capital gains exclusions I.R.C.
§§ 121, 1034

6.45

1,301.54

294.60

41.80

1,420.08

500.66

139.29

1,355.66

1,645.98

213.71

7,671.26

3,037.22

Real property tax deduction

Imputed rental income exclusion
(2004–2022)
Total

3,593.98

595.98

C. Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget—the Taxpayer’s Perspective

What is the impact of these billions and trillions of tax expenditures on actual
families? The answer depends on a myriad of particular circumstances such as the
size of the mortgage, real property tax rates, local patterns in appreciation, and
duration of ownership. An exploration of a range of typical circumstances would go
far to illuminate this important question. In the meantime, one commentator has
made a noteworthy effort to quantify the contribution to wealth from the federal and
state tax benefits of homeownership: Based on the purchase of a modest home in
California by a married couple for $20,000 in 1965 with a thirty-year fixed-rate
mortgage plus a 10 percent interest rate, the use of part of the home for a daycare
business, and a later $30,000 expansion, he estimated that the federal income tax
savings alone over forty-nine years exceeded $182,000 with the result that this family
enjoyed the equivalent of an additional $912,300 in income.151 Valued at $1 million
at the death of the parents, their child inherited the home free of tax and with a fair
market value basis that would allow her to sell for $1 million in cash without paying
any tax.152 Or live in it and reap the homeowners’ tax benefits for another generation.153
IV. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP

With billions of dollars in tax benefits going to homeowners every year, why
have generations of Black Americans disproportionately chosen to be renters rather
than homeowners? The short answer is that historically, Black families have had
little choice. Overt racial discrimination and the structural racism that such past
discrimination created prevented Black American families from achieving the
150. Calculations by author and adjusted for 2022 dollar amounts in billions. Table 1 US Treasury Analytic

Perspectives, Tax Expenditures, 1975–2021.

151. David Hasen, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Our Homeowner Tax Rules 2–3, 9

tbl.1 (2015).

152. Id. at 2; see discussion supra pp. 265–66.
153. Id. at 9 tbl.1.
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American Dream for most of the twentieth century,154 and in this century there has
been little improvement. Those structures fueled the racial wealth gap back then and
continue to do so today.
There are three essentials for purchasing a home in the United States: a willing
seller of desirable housing, a lender, and some cash for the down payment. For most
Black Americans, racialized social and legal structures have put all three of these
essentials out of reach.155
A. Willing Sellers and Residential Segregation

A new body of scholarship has documented laws and government policies that
barred Black American families from property ownership well into the twentieth
century, created racialized ghettos, turned integrated communities into segregated
neighborhoods, supported private discrimination in housing,156 and denied Black
veterans their due under the G.I. Bill.157 These legal barriers and active discrimination
excluded Black families from buying homes in desirable neighborhoods and
participating in the waves of real estate appreciation that built wealth for white,
middle-class families in the years after World War II.158
B. Mortgage Lenders

For many Black Americans, finding a mortgage lender was and is a hurdle. The
problem is two-fold: Lenders either refuse to lend when the home is in a predominantly
Black community, like the ones created by the federal government itself, or lenders
require larger down payments, more collateral, and higher interest rates of Black
borrowers.159 Many of these hurdles were erected by federal government policy such as
mortgage and insurance redlining that made many Black neighborhoods into no-loan,
no-investment zones.160 Similarly, the Federal Housing Administration—the federal
mortgage insurer—kept Black families out of integrated and white-majority
neighborhoods by promoting racialized zoning restrictions that prohibited the
occupancy of houses “except by the races for which they were intended.”161
154. See Chused, supra note 36, at 321–25.
155. Barriers to Minority Homeownership, U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urb. Dev., https://archives.hud.gov/reports/

barriers.cfm (Apr. 9, 2010).

156. For example, the notorious restrictive racial covenants for Levittown. Rothstein, supra note 28, at 156.
157. See generally id.; Sarah E. Turner & John Bound, Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the

G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans 2–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 9044, 2002) (comparing the effects of the G.I. Bill on Black and white
veterans).

158. See Rothstein, supra note 28, at 139, 156.
159. See id.; Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 139–49.
160. Rothstein, supra note 28, at 67. The maps were drawn in 1935 at the behest of the Home Owners’

Loan Corporation. See Chused, supra note 36, at 319–20.

161. Rothstein, supra note 28, at 67; Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 41.
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Racial discrimination in housing markets continues to this day. In 2020, Black
mortgage applicants were turned down at more than twice the rate of white
applicants: 27.1 percent of Black families as compared to 13.6 percent of whites.162 A
recent lawsuit filed against State Farm Insurance revealed a practice of routinely
alleging fraud in primarily Black communities and refusing to honor claims of Black
property owners.163 And redlining continues in various forms.164
C. Down Payments

The final home-buying essential is some form of personal or family wealth that
can supply the down payment. Here, the racial wealth gap is at issue and the vicious
cycle that it sets up. Black families with less wealth in the parent generation have less
ability to help the child generation get a foothold in homeownership that could create
more wealth for the next generations. Even Black families who are homeowners may
not be able to use their homes as collateral for a loan to help their children to the
same extent that white families can. Black-owned real property is routinely
undervalued and overtaxed.165 Appraisers repeatedly undervalue Black-owned homes,
diminishing the owner’s opportunity to sell for a fair price or obtain adequate
insurance, a conventional mortgage, or a home equity loan.166
V. CONCLUSION: CAN TAX REFORM MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Racial discrimination was not introduced into American life by the federal
income tax. Nor did it create the institutional racism that one can see at work in the
racial homeownership gap. But it is essential to recognize that through tax benefits
for homeowners, for generations the federal income tax has contributed to the racial
wealth gap. If this is so, what is to be done?
Some of the tax subsidies for homeownership are much criticized, and rightly so,
for favoring the wealthy, driving up residential real estate prices, encouraging
overinvestment in owner-occupied housing, and contributing to overall economic
and racial inequality.167 Proposals for reform range from turning the HMID and real
162. Jung Hyun Choi et al., What Different Denial Rates Can Tell Us About Racial Disparities in the Mortgage

Market, Urb. Inst. (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/what-different-denial-ratescan-tell-us-about-racial-disparities-mortgage-market; see also Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
§ 302, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (addressing incidents of redlining).

163. See, e.g., Complaint, Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.1 20-CV-01121 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14,

2020); Emily Flitter, State Farm Sees Fraud. Clients See Discrimination., N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2022, at B1.

164. See, e.g., Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Modern-Day Redlining: How Banks Block People of Color

from Homeownership, Chi. Trib. (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-bizmodern-day-redlining-20180215-story.html.

165. Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 52–54.
166. See, e.g., Debra Kamin, An Appraisal That ‘Kind of Broke’ One Homeowner, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 2020, at

B1.

167. See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 329, 360–62 (2009) (discussing

the racial inequality associated with tax benefits and homeownership); Brown, supra note 74, at 206–10
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property tax deduction into a tax credit, or even a refundable tax credit, to allowing
deductions when homes sell at a loss, to outright repeal of all the tax preferences for
homeownership.168 Although still political hot buttons, proposals to repeal the
HMID and real property tax deduction are not as improbable as they once were,
now that taxpayers are being weaned away from claiming itemized deductions by the
2017 TCJA’s near doubling of the standard deduction.
But even repealing the HMID, real property tax deduction, exclusion of gains on
sale of the principal residence, and step up in basis on the homeowner’s death would
still leave the largest tax expenditure for homeowners in place: the exclusion of
imputed rental income. Taxing imputed rental income is probably not feasible in the
United States today for practical and political reasons any more than it was in 1864.
If the HMID is aptly called the political third rail in tax policy, trying to tax imputed
rental income must be a nuclear weapon. Yet there is another way to level the playing
field: a residential renter’s tax credit.
A residential renter’s tax credit would put renting and owning on a more equitable
footing. It would end the shifting of the tax burden from owners to renters that the
exclusion of imputed rental income now produces. In a “rough justice” way, it would
contribute to wealth formation for renters as the exclusion of imputed rental income
now does for owner-occupied housing. What impact a renter’s tax credit would have
on the racial homeownership gap is not clear; it could change preferences for
homeownership all around. But it could contribute meaningfully to at least narrowing
the racial wealth gap. Likewise, how such a tax credit should be designed—as a
refundable credit, with or without a cap, whether phased in or immediate—requires
further work. It would also be important to understand the impact it would have on
the residential housing market overall.169 The Civil War income tax system does
provide a precedent for this solution and there may be useful lessons to learn from
that experience.170
A residential renter’s tax credit would go a long way to mitigating what Seligman
described as the manifest injustice of leaving imputed rental income untaxed, namely,
its contributions to the racial wealth gap across generations. Reform of this kind will
not undo the harm that the racial wealth gap has caused Black families, and indeed,
our entire nation. But it could stop the damage going forward. A residential renter’s
tax credit is worth exploring.
(pointing out racism in the U.S. tax system); Ventry, supra note 74, at 181, 182–86 (reporting on inequities
associated with mortgage interest deductions); see also Elaine Sorensen et al., Redirecting Welfare
Policy Toward Building Strong Families 1–3 (Elaine Sorensen ed., 2000) (discussing the relationship
between redistricting and family composition).
168. A tax deduction is applied before calculating tax owed to reduce the amount of your taxable income.

Credits and Deductions for Individuals, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions-for-individuals (Apr. 8,
2022). In contrast, a tax credit reduces the tax owed dollar for dollar. Id.

169. See Brown, supra note 167 (suggesting that a deduction for renters would only enrich landlords).
170. Seligman 1894, supra note 146 (discussing fraud associated with Civil War-era income taxes). But in our

digital age, these issues should be more manageable.
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The impediments to racial equality hide in plain sight in our society, embedded
in some surprising places. The federal income tax is one such place. Although
concepts such as “taxation” and “structural racism” may not generally spring to mind
in the same thought, examined in the context of social and economic reality such as
barriers to homeownership for Black Americans, the IRC emerges as a sturdy source
of inequality, generation after generation reliably contributing to racial disparities in
wealth and poverty, well-being and economic fragility. Colorblind on its face but not
in its impact, the IRC has fueled the racial wealth gap for many decades.171 It is time
to change the story.

171. On its face, the IRC is race-blind with one exception. There are several provisions that concern Native

Americans, such as the Indian Employment Credit, I.R.C. §§ 38(b)(10), 45; the Indian Health Care
and General Welfare Benefits, I.R.C. §§ 139D, 139E; the Alaskan Native Claims Act and Settlement
Trusts, I.R.C. §§ 139G, 247, 6039H; and the Native American Sovereignty, I.R.C. §§ 168(h)(2)(A),
170(q)(7), 401, 414, 415, 646, 1033, 1391, 1402, 2055, 2106, 2522, 3121, 3306, 3309, 3402, 3511, 4225,
4377, 4484, 4965, 5000A, 6421, 6427, 7526A, 7701, 7871, 7873, 9801.
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